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Abstract 
The past decade has seen remarkable evolution in the field of international law in relation to 
the protection of human rights, though much of the law reflecting this evolution is either soft 
law or only binding at the domestic level. Businesses formerly insulated by the cover of 
private law, are receiving greater attention for their role in human rights abuses, a field 
generally defined and defended by public law. Almost in parallel, the role of states in 
protecting human rights outwith their borders has also shifted. Gone are the days when states 
simply looked the other way as the populations of another state suffered due to the neglect or 
offenses of their government. A collective conscience has evolved – a conscience that no 
longer tolerates human deprivation and suffering at the hands of actors that were formerly 
‘off-limits’ for the purposes of global human rights scrutiny. This paper examines the 
expanding recognition of business as a human rights duty-bearer and how this expansion 
reflects the transitioning role of states through the responsibility to protect concept. The key 
to both developments lies in the need for states to focus on prevention by carrying out 
effective due diligence. 
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The implementation of REDD+ activities and policies may have significant social and 
environmental impacts. On the one hand, restrictions upon forest uses associated with 
avoided deforestation and degradation may affect indigenous peoples and other forest-
dependent communities’ livelihood and means of subsistence. On the other, activities 
carried out to enhance forest carbon stocks, such as afforestation, may have negative 
impacts on biodiversity, by replacing biodiversity-rich non-forested landscapes with 
biodiversity-poor forest plantations. Furthermore, the implementation of REDD+ 
activities could be difficult in the context faltering regulatory environments that tend to 
characterise forest governance in developing countries. Awareness of these potential 
trade-offs and risks prompted the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to warn 
that forest-based mitigation activities need to avoid negative impacts associated with 
competition between land uses.1 
Negotiations on REDD+ have witnessed a lively debate on how to avoid 
perverse outcomes and combine REDD+ activities and policies with the pursuit of co-
benefits (or multiple benefits, as they have also been termed),2 such as biodiversity 
conservation, improved forest governance and a wide array of societal advantages.  
UNFCCC Parties’ understanding on how to pursue this potential has evolved 
over time and is still in the process of forming. At the beginning of negotiations on 
REDD+, UNFCCC Parties merely recognised that REDD+ could promote co-benefits 
and complement the aims and objectives of other relevant international agreements and 
conventions.3 They subsequently recognized the importance of promoting co-benefits,4 
and, eventually, of incentivizing so-called “non-carbon benefits” for the long-term 
sustainability of REDD+ activities.5 The term non-carbon benefits has been generically 
used to refer to social, environmental and governance benefits produced by REDD+ 
activities that go beyond mere carbon storage, such as, for example, biodiversity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
∗ Research and Teaching Fellow in Global Environmental Law, University of Edinburgh Law School, 
United Kingdom. The author gratefully acknowledges the support received from the LUC4C project 
(http://luc4c.eu) during the preparation of this piece. 
1 Gert J Nabuurs and others, ‘Forestry’ in B Metz and others (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2007), at 543. 
2  UN-REDD Programme, ‘Multiple Benefits-Issues and Options for REDD’ (UN-REDD 2009) 
<http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=472&Itemid=53> 
accessed 10 January 2015. 
3 Decision 2/CP.13, Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to 
stimulate action, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, Preamble. 
4  Decision 4/CP.15, Methodological guidance for activities relating to reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 
Preamble. 
5 Decision 9/CP.19, Work programme on results-based finance to progress the full implementation of the 
activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, para 22. 
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conservation, poverty relief, or secure land and resource tenure. At the time of writing, 
the debate on non-carbon benefits of REDD+ is still ongoing, and UNFCCC Parties are 
in the process of debating what non-carbon benefits are; whether they should be 
reported and monitored, and if so how; and whether non-carbon benefits should attract 
specific payments.6  
This range of ‘collateral’ considerations has enjoyed great prominence in the 
literature7 and in policy discourses on REDD+.8 Some commentators have emphasized 
how these considerations have taken center-stage, threatening to obfuscate the main 
purpose of REDD+.9 Others, however, have noted how failure to consider the wider 
environmental and societal impacts of REDD+ would undermine forest carbon 
sequestration.10  
This latter perspective prevailed and in 2010 the UNFCCC COP adopted a list of 
broadly worded safeguards that Parties should promote and respect in the 
implementation of REDD+ activities (Table 1).11 These safeguards acknowledge that 
REDD+ activities should avoid causing harm and enhance “other social and 
environmental benefits.”12 Therefore, REDD+ safeguards aim to ensure that REDD+ 
activities both avoid negative impacts, and provide benefits to host countries and 
affected communities, beyond mere carbon sequestration. 
From the perspective of international law, these safeguards raise two 
fundamental questions. The first is that of the role of safeguards in the emerging legal 
framework on REDD+. The second is that of the relationship of safeguards with the 
well-established bodies of international law on forests, the protection of human rights 
and the conservation of biodiversity.  
This chapter analyses these two questions. First, it assesses the legal nature of 
REDD+ safeguards and their role in the climate regime. Then, it places REDD+ 
safeguards in the context of general international law, assessing their relationship with 
other areas of the law, most saliently, those on biodiversity, forests and human rights. 
Even though it remains to be seen how REDD+ safeguards will be concretely 
interpreted in practice and how much weight will be attached to their implementation in 
result-based payments, the conclusions provide some reflections on the role of 
safeguards in the emerging legal framework on REDD+. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its thirty-eighth session, 
UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2013/3, paras 45–47; and Methodological guidance for activities relating to 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, UN Doc 
FCCC/SBSTA/2014/L.8, para 6. 
7 Compare the summary in Ingrid J Visseren-Hamakers and others, ‘Trade-Offs, Co-Benefits and 
Safeguards: Current Debates on the Breadth of REDD+’ (2012) 4 Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 646. 
8 See e.g. UN-REDD Programme (n 3); Lera Miles, Emily Dunning and Nathalie Doswald, ‘Safeguarding 
and Enhancing the Ecosystem Derived Benefits of REDD+’ (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre 2010) <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/resources-and-data/safeguarding-and-enhancing-the-
ecosystem-derived-benefits-of-redd> accessed 10 January 2015. 
9 See for example, Arild Angelsen and Desmond McNeill, ‘The Evolution of REDD+’ in Arild Angelsen 
and others (eds), Analyzing REDD+: Challenges and Choices (CIFOR 2012), at 39 and 42. 
10 See e.g. Frances Seymour, ‘Forests, Climate Change and Human Rights: Managing Risks and Trade-
Offs’, Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
11 Decision 1/CP.16, Cancun Agreements, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Appendix I, para 2. 
12 Ibid., para 2(e).  
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The status of REDD+ safeguard in general international law 
 
There is no standard definition of safeguard in international law. The term is widely 
used in the practice of States and international organisations, such as the World Bank, to 
refer to measures making financial aid conditional to the prevention and mitigation of 
“undue harm to people and their environment” that may result from funded activities.13 
These safeguards are typically part of conditions imposed upon countries receiving aid, 
and their fulfilment is a prerequisite for the provision of funding. Safeguards are often 
coupled with arrangements to monitor and verify their implementation. The 
consequences attached to lack of compliance with safeguards depend on whether !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  Cf. for example the World Bank environmental and social safeguard policies,  
<http://go.worldbank.org/WTA1ODE7T0>.  
Table 1. REDD+ safeguards in the Decision 1/CP.16, Cancun Agreements, 
Appendix I, para. 2 
 
When undertaking the activities referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision, the following safeguards 
should be promoted and supported: 
 (a) That actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest 
programmes and relevant international Conventions and agreements; 
(b) Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account 
national legislation and sovereignty; 
(c) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local 
communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national 
circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 
(d) The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous 
peoples and local communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this 
decision; 
(e) That actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological 
diversity, ensuring that the actions referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision are not used 
for the conversion of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize the protection and 
conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and 
environmental benefits;1 
(f) Actions to address the risks of reversals;  
(g) Actions to reduce displacement of emissions.  
1. Taking into account the need for sustainable livelihoods of indigenous peoples and local 
communities and their interdependence on forests in most countries, reflected in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as the International Mother Earth Day. 
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conditionality is based on policy dialogue, agreement and support, or, rather, on 
recourse to sanctions or aid withdrawal.14 
The UNFCCC COP is not in the habit of adopting safeguards or conditionalities 
for the provision of climate finance. The practice under the UNFCCC has instead been 
to leave such guidance to institutions entrusted to handle climate finance. 15 
Controversially, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have not adopted specific safeguards 
under the Clean Development Mechanism, in spite of serious concerns regarding the 
environmental integrity and the contribution to sustainable development of registered 
project activities.16 
Cognizant of lessons learnt through the CDM and of the specific potential trade-
offs associated with forest-based mitigation, the UNFCCC COP has adopted an 
unprecedented list of safeguards for REDD+ activities.17 These safeguards are not 
phrased like actual conditionalities for the provision of REDD+ funding. The wording 
introducing the safeguards merely says that they should be “promoted and supported” 
with no specific sanctions for lack of compliance. Nevertheless, the UNFCCC COP has 
subsequently clarified that, regardless of the source or type of financing, all REDD+ 
activities should be “consistent with” safeguards.18  
An embryonic system to monitor and verify the implementation of safeguards 
has also been laid out. Developing country Parties intending to undertake REDD+ 
activities are asked to adopt a system for providing information on how safeguards are 
being “addressed and respected” .19 Such information should be transparent, consistent, 
accessible by all relevant stakeholders, updated on a regular basis, country-driven and 
build upon existing systems “as appropriate.”20 The provision of information on the 
implementation of safeguards is a requirement to receive REDD+ payments. 21 
However, there is no indication on how compliance with this requirement will be 
assessed and what consequences may follow, should a party fail to comply with 
safeguards. 
Information concerning compliance with safeguards is to be included in 
periodical national communications to the UNFCCC COP22 and may also be published, 
on a voluntary basis, via a web platform on the UNFCCC website.23 Developing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Cesare Pinelli, ‘Conditionality’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
15 Compare e.g. Global Environmental Facility Policy on Agency Minimum Standards on Environmental 
and Social Safeguards (2013); and Adaptation Fund Environmental and Social Policy (2013). 
16 Joelle de Sepibus, ‘The Environmental Integrity of the CDM Mechanism – A Legal Analysis of Its 
Institutional and Procedural Shortcomings’ (Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research 2009) 
<http://phase1.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/research/header_ip6/environmental%20integrity%20CDM.pdf> accessed 8 
January 2015; Lena Ruthner and others, ‘Study on the Integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)’ (2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/docs/final_report_en.pdf> accessed 8 
January 2015. 
17 Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, at 2 
18 Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention, UN Doc FCCC /CP/2011/9/Add.2, para 63. 
19 Decision 1/CP.16, para 71.  
20 Decision 12/CP.17, Guidance on systems for providing information on how safeguards are addressed 
and respected and modalities relating to forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels as 
referred to in decision 1/CP.16, UN Doc FCCC /CP/2011/9/Add.2, para 2. 
21 Decision 9/CP.19, para 4.  
22 Ibid., paras 3-4. 
23 Decision 12/CP.19, The timing and the frequency of presentations of the summary of information on 
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country Parties should start providing such information after the start of the 
implementation of REDD+ activities. The frequency of subsequent submissions of 
information should be consistent with general arrangements for developing country 
Parties national communications.24  
The reporting requirements concerning the implementation of REDD+ 
safeguards, therefore, fall into the broader context of developing country Parties’ 
obligations concerning measuring, reporting and verification. Under the UNFCCC, 
developing country Parties are generally required to submit their first national 
communications within three years of entering the convention, and every four years 
thereafter.25 The UNFCCC COP has subsequently established that developing county 
Parties should also submit biennial update reports, starting with December 2014.26 
These reports are to be subjected to an expert review process of international 
consultation and analysis.27 Whether and how this process will specifically review the 
implementation of REDD+ safeguards, however, remains to be seen. 
At the time of writing, only six developing country parties have submitted 
biannual update reports.28 It is therefore too early to say how implementation of 
REDD+ safeguards is being reported and how this is reviewed in the context of 
international consultation and analysis processes. More generally, UNFCCC COP 
guidance on REDD+ safeguards does not provide details on the types of evidence that 
countries might use to show compliance with safeguards or the ways in which such 
evidence should be collected, verified or reported. These matters are in the process of 
being further discussed in the context of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technical Advice (SBSTA), which since 2011 has been considering whether and how to 
give more guidance to Parties on the type of information to be provided on compliance 
with safeguards.29  
In the meantime, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is expected to function 
as the main source of REDD+ finance in the climate regime,30 agreed on an initial 
framework for REDD+ results-based payments.31 The framework reiterates that the 
provision of summaries of information on how safeguards are implemented is a 
prerequisite for REDD+ results-based payments.32 Nevertheless, it is not clear how the 
content of these summaries will be assessed. Furthermore, there is a need to ascertain 
the compatibility the GCF Environmental and Social Safeguards with REDD+ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
how all the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, are being addressed and respected, 
para 3. 
24 Decision 12/CP.19, para 4. 
25 UNFCCC, Article 12.5. 
26 Decision 2/CP.17, at 39-44. 
27 Ibid., paras 56-62. 
28  The reports are available at: <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-
annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/items/8722.php> 
29 The issue of types of information from systems for providing information on how the safeguards are 
being addressed and respected was addressed at the forty-first session of the SBSTA in December 2014, 
but conclusions on the issue could not be adopted. The matter will be taken up again at the forty-second 
session of the SBSTA, in 2015. 
30 Decision 9/CP.19, Preamble and para 5. 
31  GCF, Initial logic model and performance measurement framework for REDD+ results-based 
payments, GCF/B.08/08/Rev.01 (2014), Annex III. 
32 Ibid. 
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safeguards33 and the consequences of lack of compliance. The GCF is therefore likely to 
assume a very prominent role in overseeing the implementation of REDD+ safeguards. 
Taken together, all these elements provide important but inconclusive elements 
to ascertain the status of REDD+ safeguards in international law. UNFCCC COP 
decisions, such as that including REDD+ safeguards, have over the years filled the 
‘open-textured’ provisions in the climate treaties with content, by adopting both ‘hard’ 
rules that Parties are expected to uphold,34 as well as ‘soft’ guidance that Parties should 
take into account while interpreting their obligations.35 Ultimately, whether decisions 
adopted by the UNFCCC COP acquire the guise of binding law is a matter of 
interpretation.36 
In the case of REDD+ safeguards, the language in UNFCCC COP decisions is 
far from univocal. The Cancun Agreements do not say that safeguards are a pre-
requisite to carry out REDD+ activities. Subsequent COP decisions have however 
clarified that REDD+ activities should be consistent with safeguards, regardless of the 
source of funding;37 and that Parties should provide information on how safeguards are 
addressed and respected to obtain results-based payments.38 Together, these elements 
may be read in the sense to suggest that compliance with REDD+ safeguards is an 
actual legal obligation for UNFCCC Parties that decide to carry out REDD+ activities 
and that ask for international payments to do so. While some UNFCCC Parties have 
argued in favour of this interpretation,39 only the practice of implementation will reveal 
whether implementation of safeguards is closely scrutinised and treated as a 
requirement for receiving REDD+ payments. In the meantime, much uncertainty 
surrounds what types of information should be provided concerning the implementation 
of safeguards. Parties’ views on this issue greatly diverge,40 and an evident tension !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33  GCF, Guiding framework and procedures for accrediting national, regional and international 
implementing entities and intermediaries, including the fund’s fiduciary principles and standards and 
environmental and social safeguards, GCF/B.06/09 (2014). 
34 Building upon the mandate conferred upon them by the treaties, as for example, Kyoto Protocol, 
Articles 3.4 and 12.7.  
35 Cf. Alan E Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ (1999) 48 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 901, at 905. See also: Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, 
‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed 
Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 The American Journal of International Law 623, at 642; and 
Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 38. 
36 See Harro van Asselt, Francesco Sindico and Michael Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change and the 
Fragmentation of International Law’ (2008) 30 Law & Policy 423, at 430. On the increasing 
informalization of the climate regime, see also Harro van Asselt, Michael Mehling and Clarisse Siebert, 
‘The Changing Architecture of International Climate Change Law’ in Geert van Calster, Wim 
Vanderberghe and Leonie Reins (eds), Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2015), at 5; and Duncan French and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Climate Change and 
International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to Somewhere’ (2013) 25 Journal of 
Environmental Law 437, at 446. 
37 Decision 2/CP.17, para 63. 
38 Decision 9/CP.19, para 4. 
39 The EU, for example, has argued: “Safeguards are an inherent, integral part of REDD+ and therefore a 
requirement that must be fulfilled in order to obtain results-based payments.” See: Views on the issues 
referred to in decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 40. Submissions from Parties and admitted observer 
organizations, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2014/MISC.4, at 33. 
40 Views on types of information from systems for providing information on how the safeguards are being 
addressed and respected and that may be provided by developing country Parties, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2014/MISC.7.  
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exists between the need to ensure comparability and some degree of streamlining in the 
information Parties provide, on the one hand; and that to enable a country-driven 
approach that is not overly burdensome, on the other. 
More generally, the overall uncertainty characterising the status of REDD+ 
under the climate regime reflects also on the legal status of REDD+ safeguards. As the 
next sections will show, the decision on whether to turn REDD+ into an offset 
mechanism à la CDM, or rather, into a means to provide financial assistance to 
developing countries in complying with their own emission reduction obligations is 
likely to have profound implications on the legal status of REDD+ safeguards.41 
Another complicating factor is that the broad wording of REDD+ safeguards 
leaves much room for discretion to UNFCCC Parties. REDD -readiness practice has 
already provided ample evidence of the diverse ways in which REDD+ safeguards may 
be interpreted. Numerous developing countries have undertaken to create the conditions 
to perform REDD+ activities, either by adhering to inter-State initiatives,42 or by 
entering into partnerships with international agencies. So while no actual results-based 
payments for REDD+ activities have been made, a vast REDD-readiness process has 
unfolded, resulting in a myriad of REDD-readiness arrangements established beyond 
the institutional scope of the UNFCCC, with no formal relation to it. 
The REDD-readiness process has been mainly (although not exclusively) driven 
by two ad hoc international agencies:43 the United Nations Collaborative Programme on 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD), 
constituted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United 
Nations Development Programme and United Nations Environmental Programme;44 
and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).45 These international 
agencies have entered into agreements with a large number of UNFCCC Parties willing 
to undertake REDD+ activities.46   
In lack of more specific guidance from the UNFCCC Parties, the UN-REDD and 
the FCPF have adopted standards to guide their partner countries in the REDD-
readiness process, including on how to operationalize safeguards. In doing so, both the 
FCPF and the UN-REDD Programme have interpreted and filled with more precise 
content REDD+ safeguards, working as de facto alternative law-making fora, 
supplementing and complementing the decisions taken by the UNFCCC COP on the 
issue. While in fact the FCPF and the UN-REDD standards are mere internal rules, their 
incorporation into partnership and borrowing agreements makes them a crucial source 
of legal obligations for partner countries and a determinant factor in the emerging body !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘Forests and Climate Change: An International Law-Making Odyssey’ (2015). 
42 For an overview, see: <http://reddplusdatabase.org> (last accessed 10 January 2015).  
43 International agencies have been defined as international bodies constituted on the basis of a decision 
by an international organization, as opposed to a treaty or a form of bottom-up cooperation between 
national regulators. See Ayelet Berman and Ramses A Wessel, ‘The International Legal Form and Status 
of Informal International Lawmaking Bodies: Consequences for Accountability’ in Joost Pauwelyn, 
Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press 
2012), 35, at 44.  
44 FAO, UNDP and UNEP, ‘UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) Framework Document’ (2008). 
45 The FCPF was launched by the World Bank in 2007, World Bank, Charter establishing the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (2013 edition).  
46  At the time of writing, the UN-REDD has partnered with 58 countries: http://www.un-
redd.org/Partner_Countries/tabid/102663/Default.aspx. 47 countries have adhered to the FCPF: 
https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/redd-country-participants. 
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of law on REDD+.47 Indeed, in the absence of more detailed guidance by the UNFCCC 
COP, standards by the UN-REDD and the FCPF have become the principal source to 
interpret REDD+ safeguards. The next section will investigate the chasm in the 
interpretation of REDD+ safeguards by these two institutions and the questions it raises 
on the relationship between REDD+ safeguard and other areas of international law.  
For the present purposes, it is possible to conclude that REDD+ safeguards are 
unprecedented in the climate regime and broke new grounds on several counts. Five 
years after their adoption, there is little clarity on their overall legal status. As part of a 
UNFCCC COP decision, formally REDD+ safeguards are not legally binding. The 
language used to formulate safeguards is not univocal in conveying a sense on whether 
they ought to be regarded as such. The fact, however, that information on the 
implementation of safeguards is a requirement for receiving result-based payments 
seems to indicate that compliance with safeguards is mandatory and therefore a legal 
obligation for Parties seeking REDD+ results-based payments. Nevertheless, UNFCCC 
COP guidance says little on how compliance with safeguards will be assessed and what 
consequences may be associated with it. Therefore, unless the UNFCCC COP or the 
GCF provide further clarification on these issues, only when REDD+ results-based 
payments start to be disbursed will it be possible to gauge whether and how compliance 
with safeguards is treated as a legally binding obligation for developing country Parties 
asking for REDD+ results-based payments. 
REDD+ safeguards and other areas of international law  !
The safeguards embedded in the Cancun Agreements focus on four core elements: the 
ecological and carbon integrity of REDD+ emission reductions; forest governance; the 
environmental and social impact of REDD+ activities; and their potential co-benefits.  
The safeguards on the ecological and carbon integrity of REDD+ activities focus 
on avoiding reversal and reducing the displacement of emissions48 and closely relate to 
UNFCCC Parties’ reporting obligations.49 The reporting of emissions and emission 
reductions in the land sector has long been a vexed question in the climate regime.50 
Presently, these matters are only sparsely covered in reporting obligations under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, leaving a wide margin of discretion to reporting 
Parties and a substantive gap in the frequency of reporting and level of detail required 
from developed and developing countries.51 This matter could be looked at afresh in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank Operational 
Standards’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Cambridge University Press 2000), at 282. 
48 Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, para 2(f-g). 
49 Decision 4/CP.15; and Decision 11/CP.19, Modalities for national forest monitoring systems UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1. 
50 For a summary, see Peter Iversen, Donna Lee and Marcelo Rocha, ‘Understanding Land Use in the 
UNFCCC’ (Climate and Land Use Alliance 2014); Zoya E Bailey, ‘Sink That Sank the Hague: A 
Comment on the Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 16 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 103; 
Eveline Trines, ‘History and Context of LULUCF in the Climate Regime’ in Charlotte Streck and others 
(eds), Climate Change and Forests. Emerging Policy and Market Opportunities (Chatham House 2008). 
51 The EU, for example, has maintained that continued implementation of existing rules would lower the 
actual stringency of the current emission reduction pledges and imply that reductions can be claimed 
without additional actions, which brings no real environmental benefit. European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
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context of the new climate agreement to be adopted in 2015.52 In this context, the 
succinct reference to addressing the risks of reversals in REDD+ safeguards could be 
translated into more specific reporting obligations to secure the ecological and carbon 
integrity of REDD+ emission reductions.  
The nature of these obligations will greatly depend on whether REDD+ will 
eventually become a mere forest carbon offset program à la CDM, or rather, a means to 
assist developing countries in complying with their own emission reduction obligations 
under the 2015 agreement. While in the first scenario, the imposition of conditionalities 
concerning carbon integrity would be associated with the tradability of offsets on 
carbon markets; in the second, a certain level of equivalence between the reporting 
obligations of developed and developing countries would need to be ensured. It would, 
in other words, be necessary to ensure that developing countries Parties obligations are 
not disproportionately burdensome, when compared with those of developed ones.  
The remainder of REDD+ safeguards has both a negative dimension– that 
connected to the prevention of harm– as well as a positive dimension –that related to the 
promotion of co-benefits and the pursuit of synergies with other forest-related 
instruments. From the perspective of international law, these safeguards raise interesting 
questions on the interplay between international law instruments.  
In this regard, REDD+ safeguards specify that REDD+ actions should 
“complement” or be “consistent with” the objectives of “relevant international 
conventions and agreements.”53 This is a significant piece of interpretative guidance 
concerning the relationship between UNFCCC Parties’ extant international obligations 
and those concerning REDD+. When faced with “implementation conflicts” – i.e. 
conflicts engendered by implementation of perfectly compatible treaty obligations –54 
REDD+ activities and policies should be carried out in such a way as to support, rather 
than conflict with, the objectives of relevant international conventions and agreements. 
As the next sections will show, a wide range of treaties and practice may be regarded as 
relevant in this connection, as the plural formulation (“conventions and agreements”) 
also suggests. 
Before analyzing in detail the interplay between these bodies of law, it necessary 
to highlight how REDD+ safeguards are also inextricably linked with the ongoing 
unresolved debate on the non-carbon benefits of REDD+. While in fact some Parties 
argue that non-carbon benefits are to be considered as integral part of REDD+ 
safeguards,55 others argue that they are a collateral issue that should not be reported in 
the context of safeguard information systems, and, most crucially, should be addressed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. ‘International climate policy post-Copenhagen: 
Acting now to reinvigorate global action on climate change,’ COM/2010/0086, at 2.2.3. 
52 Charlie Parker and others, ‘The Land-Use Sector within the Post-2020 Climate Regime’ (Nordic 
Council of Ministers 2014); Manuel Estrada and others, ‘Land Use in a Future Climate Agreement’ 
(Meridian Institute 2014). 
53 Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, para 2(a). 
54 This term is used to refer to conflicts that are engendered by implementation of perfectly compatible 
treaty obligations. See Rudiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law 
(Springer 2003), at 24 and 96.  
55 The Philippines, for example, have argued: “There is a clear linkage between NCBs and REDD-Plus 
safeguards. Reporting on NCBs could be partially covered by safeguards reporting mechanisms or 
safeguards information systems.” Views on the issues referred to in decision 1/CP.18 (2014), paragraph 
40. Submissions from Parties and admitted observer organizations, at 33.Views on the issues referred to 
in decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 40. Submissions from Parties and admitted observer organizations, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2014/MISC.4, at 33. 
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in other fora with relevant mandates, such as the CBD, the GCF or the FCPF. 56 
Ultimately, if Parties to the UNFCCC decide to include non-carbon benefits in the 
information system that has been devised for REDD+ safeguards, this would be an 
important tool to scrutinize the flow of benefits to developing countries associated with 
REDD+. This would be particularly important if REDD+ should turn into an offset 
mechanism, like the CDM. The perceived lack of a system to ensure that countries 
hosting CDM projects receive concrete benefits, in fact, has been a major shortcoming 
in the functioning of that mechanism. 57 
While Parties to the UNFCCC are yet to make up their minds on this issue, 
standards adopted in the framework of the REDD-readiness processes provide 
important insights to foresee how this complex matter may be addressed. For example, 
the UN-REDD has not attempted to draw a distinction between carbon and non carbon-
benefits of REDD+ activities. Instead, the FCPF has distinguished carbon and non-
carbon benefits,58 deciding that only the first be reported in Benefit-sharing Plans to be 
prepared to receive REDD+ results-based payments.59 The FCPF has thus anticipated 
the UNFCCC Parties’ decision on the delicate and controversial issue of non-carbon 
benefits by deciding what they are (at least in the context of FCPF payments), and that 
they should not be subjected to the same reporting requirements as carbon-related 
benefits.  
The solution to these delicate questions makes it even more important to 
interpret REDD+ safeguards in a way that is consistent with the objectives of “relevant 
international conventions and agreements.” Guidance provided in these instruments 
usefully complements REDD+ safeguards, supplementing them with an internationally 
agreed understanding on matters upon which States have already reached painstakingly 
negotiated consensus, such as forest biodiversity and the rights of forest dependent 
communities. It is here argued, that UNFCCC Parties should rely more systematically 
on this guidance, without attempting to “reinvent the wheel.”60 The next sections 
highlight points of synergies with existing bodies of law, as well as matters upon which 
further guidance may be needed, distinguishing between environmental and social 
impacts and co-benefits. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Compare the submission by the EU, ibid., at 28: “the EU is of the opinion that there is no need for 
dedicated payments or price premiums for NCBs under the UNFCCC. Moreover, at international level 
this would add complexity (conceptually, technically and financially) to the REDD+ mechanism, thereby 
complicating and thus delaying implementation of REDD+’ primary objective and possibly even 
deviating from it. The EU does however see merit in (encouraging) discussions on NCBs in fora with 
relevant mandates such as the CBD, the GCF and the FCPF and is interested to learn from pilot 
experiences how NCBs can be incentivized best.”  
57 High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, ‘Climate Change, Carbon Markets and the CDM: A 
Call to Action’ (2012),18.  
58  The FCPF has defined non-carbon benefits as benefits “produced by or in relation to the 
implementation and operation of” a REDD+ program, such as “the improvement of local livelihoods, the 
building of transparent and effective forest governance structures, progress on securing land tenure, and 
enhancing or maintaining biodiversity and/or other ecosystem services. FCPF Carbon Fund 
Methodological Framework (2013), at 32. 
59 Ibid., at 25. 
60 This expression is used by Elisa Morgera, ‘No Need to Reinvent the Wheel for a Human Rights-Based 
Approach to Tackling Climate Change: The Contribution of International Biodiversity Law’ in Erkki 
Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer 2013). 
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Environmental safeguards !
As negotiations progressed, much literature drew attention to biodiversity trade-offs 
associated with REDD+ activities, suggesting that they be applied selectively to 
different forest types.61 This matter has only been partially addressed by the UNFCCC 
COP, which initially stated that REDD+ demonstration activities should be “consistent 
with” sustainable forest management, noting, inter alia, the “relevant provisions” of the 
United Nations Forum on Forests and the CBD.62 This acknowledgement of the 
relevance of international biodiversity and forest instruments, however, does not appear 
in subsequent UNFCCC COP decisions dealing with REDD+. A few UNFCCC Parties 
have supported building on synergies between REDD+, the CBD and international 
forest instruments.63 REDD+ safeguards, instead, do not mention the matter. Instead, 
they generically indicate that REDD+ activities should be “consistent with the 
conservation of natural forests and biological diversity”; and should not be used for the 
conversion of natural forests, 64  but, rather, to incentivize their protection and 
conservation and to enhance other “environmental benefits.”65 Thus safeguards only 
timidly address the matter of overlaps between REDD+ and the vast body of law 
concerning forests and biodiversity. These two bodies of international law have 
inherently different characteristics.  
On the one hand, no comprehensive international treaty on forests exists. Instead, 
States have cyclically rejected proposals to negotiate an all-encompassing forest treaty 
and, ultimately, to subject themselves to greater international scrutiny on how they 
manage their forests. Rather tellingly, there is no internationally agreed definition of 
what a forest is, and the understanding of this term is highly context-specific.66 As a 
result, forest issues are addressed in an uncoordinated manner by a large number of 
international instruments and institutions.67 The resulting legal landscape is greatly 
fragmented and consists of a heterogeneous set of instruments, which include treaties,68 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 See e.g. Till Pistorius et al., ‘Greening REDD+. Challenges and Opportunities for Forest Biodiversity 
Conservation,’ University of Freiburg. (Freiburg, Germany 2010), at 21; and Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘REDD-plus and Biodiversity. CBD Technical Series No. 59’ 
(Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2011). For a detailed review, see Annalisa 
Savaresi, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries under the UNFCCC: Caveats 
and Opportunities for Biodiversity’ (2010) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 81; and 
Annalisa Savaresi, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. A New Opportunity for Promoting Forest 
Conservation?’ in Frank Maes and others (eds), Biodiversity and Climate Change: Linkages at 
International, National and Local Levels (Edward Elgar 2013). 
62 Decision 2/CP.13, Annex, para 8. 
63 See, UNFCCC, Views on methodological guidance for activities relating to reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. Submissions from Parties, UN Doc 
FCCC/SBSTA/2011/MISC.7, Submissions by Australia, at 6; European Union, at 59; El Salvador on 
behalf of Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama, at 38-42; and Japan, at 82. 
64 Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, para 2(e). 
65 Ibid. 
66 CBD SBSTTA, Background Report on Improving Forest Biodiversity Monitoring and Reporting, UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/16/INF/25, at 5. 
67 For a comprehensive overview, see Juergen Blaser and others, ‘Independent Assessment of the 
International Arrangement on Forests. Report of the Team of Independent Consultants’ (2014). 
68 Such as the various editions of the International Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983, 1994, and 2006. 
ITTA 2006, into force 7 December 2011, UNTS vol. 2801, p. 1. 
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as well an array of informal instruments.69 This fragmented body of law centers around 
two key notions: that of States’ sovereign right to exploit their forest resources; and that 
of sustainable forest management.70 However, due to the considerable multiplication of 
standards on sustainable forest management, a common understanding of this crucial 
concept has remained surprisingly elusive and largely seems to lie in the eye of the 
beholder.71 States’ obligations in this regard are context specific and depend on the 
interpretation of a layered set of international instruments of various legal natures. 
On the other hand, the CBD is the main international treaty charged with 
protecting biodiversity. As seen with the UNFCCC, the body of law under the CBD has 
significantly grown by virtue of the work of its conference of the Parties (CBD COP). 
Much like the guidance of the UNFCCC COP, the legal significance of CBD COP 
decisions is a matter of interpretation. A distinguishing feature, however, is that CBD 
decisions are characterized by a markedly hortatory tone and rarely infuse a sense of 
legally binding obligation into their guidance.72 Still, CBD COP decisions are a 
precious source of inter-governmentally agreed guidance on the interpretation of the 
CBD and on the means to achieve its objective. Most importantly, Parties to the 
UNFCCC and the CBD are virtually the same—with the sole exception of the US.  
Both conventions deal with global environmental problems and establish regimes 
of almost universal application, which prohibit Parties from making specific 
reservations to their provisions.73 The objectives of the conventions are not mutually 
exclusive, and provide several areas for mutually supportive action.74 The existence of 
common interests is, inter alia, confirmed by the establishment of a Joint Liaison Group 
as an informal forum for exchanging information, exploring opportunities for 
synergistic activities, and increasing co-ordination.75  
The CBD and the UNFCCC, however, view forests from different perspectives. 
While the CBD is concerned with forests as habitats and as components of biodiversity, 
under the UNFCCC they are chiefly carbon sinks and sources. Despite these different 
approaches, both conventions address forest management to a certain degree and, when 
implementing REDD+ activities, Parties to both conventions are faced with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 These include: Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on 
the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests (Forest Principles), 
31 I.L.M. 881 (1992); and Non-legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable Forest Management of all 
Types of Forests, UNGA/Res/62/98; as well as decisions by treaty bodies, such as those adopted under 
the CBD and the ITTA.  
70 Forest Principles, at 1(a); and 2 (a). 
71 Diana Davenport, ‘Forests and Sustainability’ in Jeremy Rayner, Alexander Buck and Pia Katila (eds), 
Embracing Complexity: Meeting the Challenges of International Forest Governance (IUFRO 2011), at 
87. 
72 On CBD COP decisions, see: Stuart R Harrop and Diana J Pritchard, ‘A Hard Instrument Goes Soft: 
The Implications of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Current Trajectory’ (2011) 21 Global 
Environmental Change 474. 
73 CBD, Article 34; and UNFCCC, Article 24.  
74 See Concetta M Pontecorvo, ‘Interdependence between Global Environmental Regimes: The Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate Change and Forest Protection’ (1999) 59 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 
705, at 742; and Frederic Jacquemont and Alejandro Caparrós, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Climate Change Convention 10 Years After Rio: Towards a Synergy of the Two Regimes?’ 
(2002) 11 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 169, at 178; and Harro 
van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection 
of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’ (2012) 44 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics 1205, at 1228-1242. 
75 Decision 13/CP.8, Cooperation with Other Conventions, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1.  
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implementation conflicts, as a focus on maximizing carbon sequestration may have 
negative impacts on biodiversity conservation. When faced with such implementation 
conflicts, Parties to both the CBD and the UNFCCC should consider the obligations and 
guidance adopted under both, interpreting them in a mutually supportive way, rather 
than in a conflicting fashion. This is explicitly conveyed in REDD+ safeguards and has 
been further elaborated upon in a series of CBD COP decisions, which, in a typically 
hortatory tone, draw attention to synergies and complementarities between the 
UNFCCC and the CBD on REDD+. 76  
Firstly, CBD Parties are encouraged to implement ecosystem-management 
activities, including the protection of natural forests, natural grasslands, and peatlands, 
and the sustainable management of forests, with consideration of the use of native 
communities of forest species in reforestation activities.77 Secondly, CBD Parties are 
invited to carry out REDD+ activities selectively; limiting the degradation and clearing 
of primary and secondary forests; converting only land of low biodiversity value or 
ecosystems largely composed of non-native species; avoiding invasive alien species; 
preventing the net reduction of carbon stocks in all organic carbon pools; and 
strategically locating afforestation activities within the landscape to enhance 
connectivity.78 Most crucially, CBD Parties are invited to use strategic environmental 
assessments and environmental impact assessments to increase the positive impacts and 
to reduce the negative impacts of climate-change mitigation and adaptation measures on 
biodiversity.79  
In sum, CBD COP decisions have integrated guidance provided in REDD+ 
safeguards, taking a “holistic” and proactive stance on the matter, which is fitted with 
the all-encompassing objective of the CBD and its efforts to promote concerted action 
under the Rio Conventions.80 The CBD COP has, nevertheless, been cautious in 
underscoring that its guidance should not pre-empt any future decisions taken under the 
UNFCCC.81 Its guidance is phrased in a hortatory tone and hardly conveys a sense of 
legal bindingness. Still, it provides very important elements on how CBD Parties should 
carry out REDD+ activities in light of their obligations under the CBD. And, as all 
UNFCCC Parties eligible to carry out REDD+ activities are also Parties to the CBD, 
these States should, by virtue of their obligations under the CBD, perform REDD+ 
activities in line with CBD guidance. 
In addition to this interpretative work, the CBD treaty bodies have engaged in the 
debate on REDD+ safeguards under the UNFCCC by submitting views on 
methodological guidance for REDD+.82 The submitted material includes a review of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Decision IX/16, Biodiversity and Climate Change UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29; CBD Decision 
X/33, Biodiversity and Climate Change UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27; CBD Decision X/36, Forest 
Biodiversity UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/36; CBD Decision XI/19, Biodiversity and climate 
change related issues UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35; and CBD Decision XI/21, Biodiversity and 
climate change UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35.  
77 Decision X/33, at 8(n). 
78 Ibid. at 8(o-p). 
79 Ibid., at 8(u). 
80 See Elisa Morgera, ‘Faraway, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions between the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 85, 91-92. 
81 Decision X/33, at 9(g-h). 
82 See e.g. CBD Secretariat, ‘Submission by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on methodological 
guidance for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
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REDD+ safeguards and UN-REDD and the FCPF standards, finding that they do not 
cover all biodiversity-related risks equally or in sufficient detail.83 Identified gaps 
include risks associated with afforestation in areas of high biodiversity value; the 
displacement of deforestation and forest degradation to areas of lower carbon value and 
high biodiversity value; and potential loss of traditional ecological knowledge.84 The 
submission mentions that guidance provided in the framework of the CBD could 
partially fill these gaps, but emphasizes the need for improved guidance.85  
In sum, the CBD Parties have engaged in the debate on REDD+ safeguards, 
making concrete efforts to build bridges between issues that are closely related both 
under the mandate of the CBD and the UNFCCC. Their proactive approach, however, 
has been countered with apathy by UNFCCC Parties. A major obstacle affecting the 
integration of guidance supplied by the CBD within REDD+ is that the Parties have 
tended to interpret the conventions’ mandate restrictively.86 
Social safeguards !
The UNFCCC COP safeguards require that REDD+ activities promote and support 
transparent and effective national forest governance, public participation, and respect 
the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities; and, more 
generally, that they enhance other social benefits.87 This de minimis guidance has not 
been further elaborated upon by the UNFCCC COP. Yet the notions of public 
participation, traditional knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local 
communities are conceptually linked to a diverse body of international law and practice 
concerning, inter alia, non-discrimination, 88  self-determination; 89  a wide range of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
developing countries (REDD-plus), specifically related to systems for providing information on how 
safeguards referred to in appendix I to UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16 are addressed and respected,’ (2011). 
83 Ibid. This review is included in the summaries of a series of expert workshops on the links between 
biodiversity and REDD+ organized to support CBD Parties’ efforts to address REDD+ in a way that 
contributes to the implementation of the CBD. 
84 Ibid., at 19.  
85 Ibid., at 29. For a detailed review, see Savaresi, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. A New Opportunity for 
Promoting Forest Conservation?’ (n 63). 
86 See van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the 
Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes,’ at 41, where the author quotes as an example the 
fact that Australia has expressed the view that the CBD and the Convention to Combat Desertification in 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 33 ILM1273 
(1994), do not have a legitimate role in climate change mitigation. Compare UNFCCC SBSTA, ‘Views 
on the Paper on Options for Enhanced Cooperation among the Three Rio Conventions, Submissions from 
Parties,’ UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.4, submission by Australia, at 5. Along similar lines, see 
Brazil’s recent submission on REDD+ non-carbon benefits, according to which ‘discussions regarding 
non-carbon benefits should be fully consistent with the respective mandates of each international regime, 
while preserving the primacy of UNFCCC over REDD+.’ See Submissions from Parties and admitted 
observer organizations, at 33.Views on the issues referred to in decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 40. 
Submissions from Parties and admitted observer organizations, FCCC/SBSTA/2014/MISC.4, at 3-4 
(emphasis added). 
87 Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, paras 2(c-e). 
88 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (New York, 7 
March 1966, in force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195. 
89 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), UN General Assembly 
Resolution, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) A/RES/61/295. 
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substantial and procedural human rights;90 and natural resources, land and property 
law.91   
The UNFCCC and REDD+ safeguards do not specifically mention human 
rights. Nevertheless, the implementation of climate change response measures, like 
REDD+, may have a host of implications on the enjoyment of several human rights. 
The Human Rights Council and its Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts have 
increasingly drawn attention to the need to take into account the human rights 
implications of climate change response measures,92 including REDD+.93 In this regard, 
they suggested that international human rights law might strengthen international, 
regional and national climate change policymaking, promoting policy coherence, 
legitimacy and sustainable outcomes.94  
So far there has been little uptake of these exhortations in international climate 
change law making. In its sole reference to human rights to date, the UNFCCC COP has 
generically recognized that Parties should fully respect human rights “in all climate 
change related actions.”95 Since the UNFCCC does not contain any conflict clause, this 
assertion is a significant statement concerning the relationship between international 
climate and human rights law. When faced with implementation conflicts, obligations 
under the UNFCCC should be interpreted in such a way as to support, rather than 
conflict with, human rights. However, not all Parties to the UNFCCC have ratified 
human rights treaties, and adherence to the UNFCCC may not become an instrument to 
impose upon States obligations contained in instruments they have not adhered to. 
Therefore, the identification of relevant human rights law and practice depends on a 
host of circumstances, and most crucially, on the human rights treaties each UNFCCC 
Party has ratified.  
In the case of REDD+, virtually all developing country Parties to the UNFCCC 
eligible to participate in REDD+ have ratified some human rights treaties.96 In this vein, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Such as those embedded in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 
December 1966, in force 23 March 1976), 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (New York, 16 December 1966, 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3; and International 
Labour Organization Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (Geneva, 27 June 1989, in force 5 September 1991) ILO/C169, as well as in regional human 
rights treaties. 
91 Such as the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 3 
November 2001, in force 29 June 2004) 2400 UNTS 303; CBD Decision X/42, Tkarihwaié:ri Code of 
Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local 
Communities, UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27; and CBD Decision VII/16, Akwé: Kon voluntary 
Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments Regarding Sacred 
Sites and Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities, UN 
Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/16; and FAO, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO, 2012). 
92 See the collection of references in Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating 
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, Mapping Human Rights 
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment. Focus 
report on human rights and climate change (2014). 
93 See e.g. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights, A/HRC/10/61 (2009), at 68. 
94 Human Rights Council Resolution 26/L.33 (2014), Preamble. 
95 See Decision 1/CP.16, para 8. 
96 Virtually all developing country Parties to the UNFCCC eligible to participate in REDD+ have ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Several have also ratified regional human rights treaties. 
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REDD+ safeguards may be regarded as sui generis conflict avoidance devices, drawing 
attention to the international human rights treaties UNFCCC Parties have ratified.97  
There however seems to be little consensus amongst UNFCCC Parties on 
making specific reference to human rights law and practice in REDD+ safeguards 
information systems. Only few UNFCCC Parties have opined that the interpretation of 
REDD+ safeguards and their reporting be more closely linked with extant human right 
law obligations.98 This matter has been addressed in greater detail by the UN-REDD 
and the FCPF, which have adopted almost opposite approaches to the issue. 
The UN-REDD has adopted standards to support partner countries in developing 
national approaches to REDD+ safeguards.99 The standards interpret the UNFCCC COP 
safeguards in light of human rights law and practice, drawing a human-rights-based 
approach to the work of the UN-REDD.100 Firstly, UN-REDD-funded programs should 
respect and promote the recognition and exercise of the rights of indigenous peoples, 
local communities and other vulnerable and marginalized groups “to land, territories 
and resources, including carbon.”101 The standards also make specific reference to the 
need to respect and protect traditional knowledge102 and cultural heritage and practices, 
and to ensure that the benefits from this knowledge are equitably shared.103 Secondly, 
the design, planning and implementation of UN-REDD funded programs must “promote 
sustainable livelihood and poverty reduction,” 104  and take into account potential 
synergies and trade-offs, respecting “local and other stakeholders’ values.”105 There is 
an evident link between these standards and economic social and cultural rights, but 
also with the rights of indigenous peoples and tribal communities to benefit from 
development,106 and with notions, like that of benefit-sharing, which have been used in 
international human rights law and practice as a means to ensure that funded activities 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Role of REDD in Harmonizing Overlapping International Obligations’ in 
Erkki Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law. A Global 
Perspective (Springer 2013), 412. 
98 Namely, those by El Salvador (on behalf of the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and 
Panama); and Switzerland. Views on Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. Submissions 
from parties, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2011/MISC.7. For example, Switzerland suggested that 
“information systems for safeguards embody and reinforce the guidance and rules of existing 
environmental and human rights treaties, particularly UNDRIP and FLEGT, when relevant.” Ibid., p. 100. 
Similarly, Chad, on behalf of Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe, suggested that 
safeguard information systems ensure consistence with international human rights law. Views on 
experiences and lessons learned from the development of systems for providing information on how all 
the safeguards are being addressed and respected and the challenges faced in developing such systems 
UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2014/MISC.6, at 17. 
99 UN-REDD, ‘Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria,’ (2012) at 3. 
100 Ibid., at 2: “The SEPC reflect the UN-REDD Programme’s responsibility to apply a human-rights 
based approach to its programming, uphold UN conventions, treaties and declarations, and apply the UN 
agencies’ policies and procedures” (emphasis added).  
101 Ibid., Principle 2, Criterion 7.  
102 Ibid., at 13. 
103 Ibid., Criterion 11, footnote. 
104 Ibid., Principle 3. 
105 Ibid., Criterion 21.  
106 UNDRIP, Article 32. 
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contribute to indigenous and other vulnerable communities’ livelihoods.107 Thirdly, UN-
REDD standards require that the design, planning and implementation of national 
REDD+ programs comply with “democratic governance,” 108  going beyond the 
UNFCCC COP safeguards, to encompass a range of elements that are typically 
associated with procedural rights to access to information, justice and public 
participation.109  
These standards are further elaborated upon in guidelines that partner countries 
should use to seek and obtain the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of affected 
stakeholders for all activities supported by the UN-REDD. In line with established 
human rights law and practice,110 the guidelines treat FPIC as a means to empower 
indigenous peoples, as well as other forest-dependent communities,111 to determine the 
outcome of decision-making that affects them, rather than merely a right to be involved 
in such processes.112 They also specify that no involuntary resettlement should take 
place as a result of REDD+ activities and/or policies.113 The identification of indigenous 
peoples should take place by means of self-identification and not be dependent upon 
whether the national government has recognized a community as indigenous.114 
As the UN-REDD standards have only recently been adopted, little evidence 
exists on how they have been implemented in practice. It already seems clear, however, 
that the UN-REDD has gone to great lengths to expand upon the UNFCCC COP 
safeguards, drawing on human rights law and practice. While the UN-REDD does not 
request partner countries to sign up to human rights treaties they have not ratified 
already, its standards openly draw upon human rights law and practice. And, although 
these standards are mere internal rules, their incorporation into partnership agreements 
makes them a crucial source of legal obligations for partner countries. 
There are no specific sanctions attached to breaches of UN-REDD standards. 
Still, agreements with partner countries include general clauses concerning suspension 
and resolution. 115  Coupled with the requirement that partner countries report 
information on implementation of the UN-REDD guidelines, in practice these standards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Extractive industries and 
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may well work as conditionalities for the provision of assistance to partner countries. 
This in turn raises the question of the legitimacy of such conditionalities, since the UN-
REDD standards draw from obligations embedded in international treaties that not all 
Parties to the UNFCCC have ratified.116 However, as States enter voluntarily into 
partnerships with the UN-REDD, they are expected to abide by its standards.  
Similar considerations apply to the recently adopted GCF Environmental and 
Social Safeguards, which explicitly mention ensuring full respect of the human rights of 
indigenous peoples, and their free, prior and informed consent, at least in certain 
circumstances.117 While not all partner countries to the UN-REDD may have adhered to 
human rights treaties protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, the protection of these 
rights is expected to be a relevant criterion to obtain REDD+ results-based payments 
from the GCF.  
Contrary to the UN-REDD, the FCPF has not elaborated specific standards for 
REDD-readiness activities. Instead, funded activities should comply with the World 
Bank’s general Operational Policies and procedures,118 taking into account the need for 
“effective participation” of forest-dependent indigenous peoples and forest dwellers in 
decisions that may affect them, respecting their rights “under national law and 
applicable international obligations.”119  
The World Bank Operational Policies have long raised criticism for subjecting 
the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to a series of distinguos.120 For 
example, indigenous peoples’ FPIC is required only when the partner country has 
ratified ILO Convention 169121 or adopted national legislation on the issue.122 Partner 
countries are merely required to engage in a process of free, prior, and informed 
“consultation”, rather than “consent”.123 When avoidance is not feasible, adverse effects 
should be “minimized, mitigated, or compensated.” 124  Involuntary resettlement is 
openly contemplated.125 
The FCPF approach has attracted some criticism. The UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues has emphasized that “displacement and exclusion of indigenous 
peoples from their forests, which may be triggered by projects funded by the 
Partnership Facility, should be avoided at all costs” and that the choice not to participate 
in REDD+ or in FCPF supported projects “should be respected”.126 An evaluation of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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FCPF has specifically underscored the need to strengthen coordination with UN-REDD, 
and resolve differences with regard to advice given to participating countries on 
implementation of social safeguards. The reluctance of the World Bank to deal with 
human rights, however, is a major hindrance towards greater coordination with the UN-
REDD.  
The divergence in safeguards adopted under the FCPF and the UN-REDD has 
resulted in the fact that the same activities in the same countries may be subject to 
different standards, depending on which institution is handling the funding. To address 
this problem, the FCPF has decided that when the fulfillment of the partnership 
agreements is delegated to third institutions that deploy more stringent standards than its 
own, the more stringent standards prevail.127 While this solution addresses questions 
associated with conflicts between standards, it also means that States that are partners 
solely to the FCPF can abide to the less stringent ones. So countries partners to the UN-
REDD Programme are expected to adhere to standards outlined in key relevant 
international instruments, and ensure that activities follow a “human rights based 
approach” and FPIC. Instead, only when a partner country has ratified ILO Convention 
169 or adopted national legislation on the issue does the FCPF require that FPIC be 
obtained.128 
The interpretation of REDD+ safeguards by REDD-readiness processes has thus 
led to a fragmented landscape, where the UN-REDD and the FCPF have taken 
diverging stances on fundamental issues, such as involuntary resettlement and FPIC. 
The chasm in the approach to REDD+ safeguards adopted by the UN-REDD and the 
FCPF is ultimately down to the different institutional cultures and practices. Such 
discrepancy in standards is hardly conducive to the establishment of a level playing 
field enabling countries to carry out REDD+ activities on an equal footing. Therefore, 
further guidance from the UNFCCC COP on these crucial issues seems indispensable. 
The UN-REDD experience has confirmed that there is ample scope to build 
upon human rights to interpret REDD+ safeguards. The added value of making 
reference to human rights lies in avoiding duplications and exploiting the consensus 
underpinning existing human rights law. Building explicit links with extant human 
rights instruments and practice, however, may be difficult, because not all State Parties 
eligible to carry out REDD+ activities are parties to the same human rights treaties. The 
FCPF has reflected this fundamental challenge in its standards, which, very much like 
UNFCCC COP safeguards, merely make reference to “relevant” international law, thus 
leaving it to partner countries to identify relevant law and its interplay with safeguards. 
This reluctance may, nevertheless, be superseded in the context of negotiations on a 
new climate agreement to be adopted in 2015, where the relationship between climate 
change and human rights is being looked anew.129 
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Conclusions !
This chapter has analyzed REDD+ safeguards, and the challenge of interpreting them in 
light of States’ extant obligations concerning biodiversity, forests, and human rights. 
Presently, ensuring that REDD+ safeguards are interpreted in line with States’ 
international law obligations remains a matter left to the autonomous efforts of national 
decision-makers and single institutions, in what Sebastian Oberthür has aptly described 
as “autonomous” or, at best, “unilateral interplay management.” This approach is 
opposed to more systemic forms of interplay management, where coordination is 
carried out by a set of institutions together, or by an overarching international 
institution.130 The risk that autonomous and unilateral interplay management endeavors 
end in incoherence is already palpable when one considers the divergence in REDD-
readiness standards. This state of affairs poses considerable challenges for developed 
countries wishing to access funding, and faced each time with different standards. 
While this is not a matter arising only with regard to REDD+,131 it is particularly 
concerning that such incoherence affects standards that are ultimately aimed at tackling 
the risk of perverse outcomes. It would therefore seem wise for UNFCCC Parties adopt 
more specific guidance on this issue.  
Experience accumulated with human rights, biodiversity and forest law and 
practice provides a precious aid on how to avoid perverse outcomes and pursue REDD+ 
co-benefits. So far guidance adopted by the UNFCCC COP has made little effort to 
draw upon these bodies of law. It has instead left a wide margin of discretion to 
UNFCCC Parties, by adopting a succinct list of very broadly worded safeguards.  
Are these safeguards imposing actual conditionalities for UNFCCC Parties 
receiving REDD+ results-based payments? For the time being, very little is known on 
the legal consequences to be attached to lack of compliance with safeguards, even 
though the suspension and withdrawal of funding would be an obvious sanction for lack 
of compliance. The extent of obligations concerning the reporting of safeguards 
implementation is equally unclear. Presently little clarity exists on how to report the 
implementation of REDD+ safeguards. In this state of uncertainty, there has been a 
proliferation of interpretations of REDD+ safeguards, which has engendered a great 
deal of confusion.  
The complex debate on REDD+ safeguards boils down to concerns over striking 
the right balance between, on the one hand, avoiding perverse outcomes and pursuing 
co-benefits, and, on the other, ensuring the feasibility of REDD+. There is furthermore 
an inherent tension between the need for international coordination and the respect for 
States’ sovereignty. Ultimately, the solution to these questions greatly depends on 
whether REDD+ will be a mere facilitative mechanism to create the circumstances for 
developing countries to comply with their own emissions reduction obligations; or, 
rather, a mechanism for forest carbon offsets à la CDM. An exhaustive answer therefore 
will only be possible when the nature of REDD+ under the climate regime will be 
eventually clarified. Two main scenarios may be envisioned. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In the first scenario, the inclusion of REDD+ in the scope of the finance 
mechanism of the Convention would entail bringing REDD+ safeguards into line with 
those adopted by the Green Climate Fund and/or the Global Environmental Facility, 
subjecting them to the same reporting and compliance regime.132 Serious questions 
would, however, arise with regard to the legitimacy of REDD+ conditionalities 
concerning the pursuit of co-benefits: why should developing countries be asked to 
produce co-benefits when they reduce their emissions, when developed countries are 
not?  
In the second scenario, REDD+ safeguards would become part of the legal 
framework established to render carbon credits generated with REDD+ activities 
fungible with the others traded on carbon markets, ensuring that they all comply with a 
minimum set of requirements, like those adopted in the context of the CDM.133 In this 
context, safeguards would operate as actual conditionalities for REDD+ payments, and 
special premiums could be designed to reward the provision of co-benefits.134   
UNFCCC Parties are still engaged in a soul-searching exercise on these issues. 
Whilst they have unequivocally acknowledged the desirability to ask Parties 
implementing REDD+ activities to avoid perverse outcomes and pursue environmental 
and social co-benefits, they have been reluctant to provide guidance on how to go about 
it, and to draw upon other existing international instruments designed to achieve these 
objectives. This is hardly surprising, and indeed is in line with the established law-
making practice under the UNFCCC, which normally avoids providing detailed 
guidance to Parties on concrete action they should undertake in order to reduce their 
emissions. Implementation of climate response measures, however, has already 
provided ample evidence that there is a need to be especially vigilant over the risk of 
perverse outcomes. An obvious point of departure to tackle this risk would therefore be 
to vigorously explore ways to ensure that UNFCCC Parties’ obligations concerning 
REDD+ are implemented in a mutually supportive fashion with those under related 
international instruments.  
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